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I. INTRODUCTION
Kenneth Humphrey—a sixty-six-year-old San Francisco resident—spent
almost an entire year in jail awaiting trial.1 Mr. Humphrey’s neighbor accused Mr.
Humphrey of stealing $5 and a bottle of cologne and threatening him.2 The judge
used the bail schedule and Mr. Humphrey’s criminal history to set the bail amount
at $600,000.3 Mr. Humphrey contested the bail amount, and eventually the court
lowered it to $350,000, which he still could not afford.4 Unfortunately, Mr.
Humphrey waited for his hearing in jail, like the numerous arrestees who cannot
afford bail.5
County jails across California often hold arrestees in jail without a conviction
or sentence solely because of their inability to post bail.6 The California bail system
disproportionately holds poor and people of color without a conviction.7 California
uses a cash bail system that requires an arrestee to pay a monetary amount out of

1. Nico Savidge, Thrust into Spotlight of California’s Crusade Against Cash Bail, Kenneth Humphrey
Hopes to Be an Example, MERCURY NEWS (Nov. 28, 2020), https://www.mercurynews.com/2020/11/28/thrustinto-spotlight-of-californias-crusade-against-cash-bail-kenneth-humphrey-hopes-to-be-an-example/ (on file with
the University of the Pacific Law Review).
2. Id.
3. Id.; see also Lindsey Carlson, Bail Schedules: A Violation of Judicial Discretion, PRETRIAL JUST. INST.
(Dec.
6,
2010),
https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=b646a57f6399-2fe4-5683-021480c3634a (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (defining bail schedules
as a procedural scheme made by local officials–or codified in state law–that assign standard bail amounts based
on the offense).
4. See In re Humphrey, 11 Cal. 5th 135, 146 (2021) (providing that the court lowered the bail to $350,000
because Mr. Humphrey was getting treatment without considering whether he can pay the new amount).
5. Savidge, supra note 1; see Thanithia Billings, Private Interest, Public Sphere: Eliminating the Use of
Commercial Bail Bondsmen in the Criminal Justice System, 57 BOS. COLL. L. REV. 1337, 1339 (2016) (exposing
that millions of prisoners in the United States are currently imprisoned due to their inability to pay bail).
6. See Lil Kalish, California Will No Longer Jail People Just Because They’re Poor, MOTHER JONES (Mar.
25, 2021), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2021/03/california-will-no-longer-jail-people-just-becausetheyre-poor/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (reporting that roughly 40,000 people are in
California’s county jails awaiting their hearings).
7. See Wendy Sawyer, How Race Impacts Who is Detained Pretrial, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Oct. 9,
2019), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2019/10/09/pretrial_race/ (on file with the University of the Pacific
Law Review) (proclaiming that the last nationwide study showed that nearly 7 in 10 detainees awaiting trial were
people of color).
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pocket or obtain a surety to cover the amount to secure their release.8 Under a cash
bail system, courts set a fee that a detainee must pay to guarantee they will return
to all future hearings.9 California has one of the largest populations of individuals
in jail before trial or conviction in the nation.10 Unfortunately, the inability to post
bail increases recidivism rates for prisoners because being detained for long
periods of time pretrial correlates with new criminal activity.11 By holding such a
sizeable pretrial population in jails, the cash bail system only further exacerbates
high incarceration rates and subsequent jail growth.12
California legislators proposed SB 262 to reform the cash bail system.13 SB
262 would have aimed to change California’s pretrial laws requiring detainees to
pay bail and court fees before a guilty conviction to secure their release.14 SB 262
would have been progressive for bail reform because it would have changed
pretrial conditions for low-level offenders, but it would not have solved the bail
problem for the exempt offenders.15 The Legislature should adopt rules to delegate
some of the judge’s discretion to the community and provide more guidance in
adopting a statewide bail schedule to alleviate bail problems.16

8. See Evan Harris, Opinion: Cash Bail Remains a Major Contributor to Mass Incarceration in California,
TIMES SAN DIEGO (May 15, 2021), https://timesofsandiego.com/opinion/2021/05/15/cash-bail-remains-a-majorcontributor-to-mass-incarceration-in-california/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review)
(explaining that California uses a cash bail system in its courts).
9. See id. (defining the cash bail system as a system that California courts use where they require a
defendant to pay some amount of money as a guarantee they will return to future hearings).
10. See Kalish, supra note 6 (revealing that California has the second-highest pretrial detention rate in the
country).
11. See Christopher T. Lowenkamp et al., The Hidden Costs of Pretrial Detention LAURA AND JOHN
ARNOLD FOUND. 19 (2013), https://craftmediabucket.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/PDFs/LJAF_Report_hiddencosts_FNL.pdf (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (finding that people detained pretrial were
“1.3 times more likely” to engage in new criminal activity twelve months after the court resolved their case than
a person who the court released pretrial at some point ).
12. See Understanding and Confronting the Prison-Industrial Complex, ARABELLA ADVISORS 10–11 (Oct.
2018),
https://www.arabellaadvisors.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Understanding-and-Confronting-thePrison-Industrial-Complex.pdf (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining that bail bond
agents are “egregious actors” who exploit their power to jail people and contribute to the prison-industrial
complex); see also What is a Bail Agent?, CAL. BAIL AGENTS ASS’N, https://cbaa.com/bail-agent-portal/ (last
visited Aug. 10, 2021) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (defining a bail agent as “any
person, agency or corporation that will act as a surety and pledge money or property as bail for the appearance of
a defendant in court”).
13. See SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 262, at 5 (Mar. 23, 2021)
(stating "[t]he reforms in SB262 will end unnecessary pretrial incarceration and eliminate the bail industry’s
unjust profiteering”).
14. Id.
15. See Matthew J. Hegreness, America’s Fundamental and Vanishing Right to Bail, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 909,
958 (2013) (describing the elimination of the right to bail); see also SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY,
COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 262, at 5 (Mar. 23, 2021) (detailing how reforming bail required changing the cash
bail system).
16. See Pretrial Release in California: Legal Parameters for Evidence-Based Practices, NAT’L CTR. FOR
STATE
CTS.
1,
9–10
(Aug.
23,
2015),
https://www.ncsc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0017/1583/23bpretriallegalbrief82315.ashx.pdf (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review) (describing how California should adopt evidence-based pretrial rulings).
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Cash bail reform is a decades-long conversation in America.17 The need for
reform grew as incarceration rates increased dramatically in America.18 Section A
deliberates on the history and purpose of bail in America, and how California uses
bail today.19 Section B looks at the issue of mass incarceration in California
today.20
A. History of Bail in the United States
Since the U.S. legal system’s inception, it has used a cash bail system.21 Courts
historically used bail to ensure the defendant appears in court.22 The first Congress
established the right for a detainee to secure their release with bail, and prohibited
excessive bail with the Judiciary Act of 1789 (“Judiciary Act”).23 Notably, courts
do not allow bail for capital offenses when the presumption of guilt against the
detainee is great.24 The Judiciary Act provided a federal right to bail for almost 200
years in America until Congress revoked this right.25 Subsection 1 explores how
the federal government eliminated the right to bail.26 Subsection 2 explains the
contemporary California cash bail system and highlights its flaws.27
1. How America Eliminated Detainees’ Right to Bail
In the 1940s, judges functionally changed the purpose of bail when they began
to analyze the detainee’s risk of fleeing before their hearings when setting bail.28
Congress then enacted The Bail Reform Act of 1966 that allowed courts to
consider evidence against the detainee and their detainee’s characteristics when

17. See Jade Gasek, Comment, Community First: Why California’s Elimination of Cash Bail May Have
Missed the Mark, 51 U. PAC. L. REV. 1, 6 (2019) (pointing to President Johnson’s proclamation as the start of the
legal battle against money bail in the 1960’s).
18. See Understanding and Confronting the Prison-Industrial Complex, supra note 12, at 4 (recognizing
that ending mass incarceration requires fundamentally reforming “sentencing policies and drug laws, as well as
reforms of prosecutorial and policing practices that correlate with soaring prison populations.”).
19. Infra Section II.A.
20. Infra Section II.B.
21. See Jordan Gross, Devil Take the Hindmost: Reform Considerations for States with a Constitutional
Right to Bail, 52 AKRON L. REV. 1043, 1048 (2018) (emphasizing that America has had the same bail system
since its inception because the system predated America’s independence).
22. See Carlson, supra note 3 (explaining that the role of bail historically was to ensure that the defendant
would return to trial).
23. Hegreness, supra note 15, at 947.
24. See id. at 924 (highlighting that the consensus right to bail clause in most states had proof element).
25. Id. at 914 .
26. Infra Subsection II.A.1.
27. Infra Subsection II.A.2.
28. Gasek, supra note 17, at 6.
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setting bail.29 Congress continued to give justices greater discretion when setting
bail amounts for detainees with the passing of The Bail Reform Act of 1966.30 The
California Supreme Court has provided guidance in changing the system this
year.31
The Bail Reform Act of 1984 (“Bail Reform Act”) drastically changed
America’s bail system.32 Prior to the Act, forty-eight states protected the right of a
detainee to secure their release before trial with statutes or constitutional
provisions.33 The Bail Reform Act gave judges the authority to deliberate on a
detainee’s potential danger to the community when setting a bail amount.34
Congress wanted courts to weigh the competing interests of the detainee against
the interests of public safety when setting bail.35 Courts can set high bail amounts
or deny bail outright to protect the public.36 Congress also allowed courts to deny
bail for detainees in noncapital cases for the first time.37 Currently, courts may also
deny bail in non-capital cases if they consider the detainee a flight risk or a danger
to a person or the community.38
In the United States Supreme Court case, United States v. Salerno, an arrestee
challenged the Bail Reform Act’s constitutionality.39 The federal district court
denied bail altogether, ordering the jail to hold the detainees before trial with no
means of securing their release.40 The detainees challenged the Bail Reform Act’s
on the grounds that denial of bail violated their right to a fair judicial process.41
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals order to vacate the ruling.42 The
Court held there was a limited exception to pretrial detention, which was to protect
the public.43 Further, the Supreme Court held that the Bail Reform Act fell within

29. Id.; see also Hegreness, supra note 15, at 957 (showing that federal government brought the change to
§ 46 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with the Bail Reform Act of 1966).
30. Hegreness, supra note 15, at 957.
31. See In re Humphrey, 11 Cal. 5th 135, 143 (2021) (holding that it is unconstitutional to detain a person
solely because they cannot afford bail).
32. See Gasek, supra note 17, at 7 (emphasizing that the federal government embraced bail reform efforts
in enacting this law).
33. Hegreness, supra note 15, at 949.
34. See id. at 958 (providing that the Bail Reform Act was the first law in American history that allowed
judges to consider the dangers to the community or another person).
35. Id. at 960.
36. See id. (“This is the first law in America—colonial, territorial, federal, or state—that allowed judges
to consider ‘danger to the community or any other person’ as a reason for denying bail, albeit for the limited case
of a defendant seeking release after conviction.”).
37. Id. at 959–960 .
38. Id. at 960.
39. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 739 (1987) (discussing the defendant’s argument that the
act violated the Fifth Amendment’s substantive due process by permitting excessive punishment pretrial).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 744; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V (setting forth that no person shall be “deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law”).
42. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).
43. Id.
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this limited exception , and was therefore constitutional.44 Since United States v.
Salerno, neither the courts nor legislature have made significant changes to the
federal bail system.45
In 2021, the California Supreme Court held that it is unconstitutional when a
jail holds a detainee solely because they cannot pay their bail amount.46 Mr.
Murphy was unable to pay bail and sat in jail waiting for his hearing.47 The court
found the District Court should have released Kenneth Murphy.48 Additionally, the
Court determined that bail amounts in the range of $600,000 or even $350,000
were unreasonably high.49 The California Supreme Court held that district courts
need to consider the defendant’s financial means when setting a bail amount.50
Further, bail must be set at a price that the defendant can reasonably afford.51 The
California Supreme Court did not define what constitutes a reasonable amount in
this opinion.52 The lower courts must now consider a detainee’s financial situation
when setting a bail amount since the California Supreme Court set the precedent.53
2. California’s High Bail and Disparities Based on Geographically
Determined Bail Amounts
California uses a cash bail system in which courts set a monetary bail amount
that a detainee must pay to ensure their release.54 California most commonly uses
a schedule to set a bail amount that the defendant must pay.55 A bail schedule is a
judicially drafted list of bail amounts set for each offense, and the schedule
contributes to the high bail amounts.56 Judges also contribute to California’s high
bail amounts by using their discretion to set the amount.57 Subsection a describes

44. Id.; see also Hegreness, supra note 15, at 959 (revealing that Justice Rehnquist was the “right-hand
man” as Assistant Attorney General to then Attorney General in Nixon’s Department of Justice).
45. See Gasek, supra note 17, at 7 (finding that the United States has continued the status quo since the
Bail Reform Act of 1984).
46. In re Humphrey, 11 Cal. 5th 135, 143 (2021).
47. Id. at 145–146.
48. Id. at 148–49.
49. See id. at 148 (explaining the court found that these sums were a substantial amount).
50. Id. at 153.
51. Id.
52. See id. at 156 (providing that courts must set an amount that is reasonable but omitting any definition
of what is reasonable).
53.
See
Precedent,
LEGAL
INFO.
INST
(last
updated
May
2020),
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/precedent (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining
that a Supreme Court ruling sets an authority that the courts that precede it must follow).
54. See Harris, supra note 8 (explaining that California uses a cash bail system in their courts).
55. Pranita Amatya et al., Bail Reform in California, UCLA DEPT. PUB. POL’Y 16 (May 2017),
http://pretrialservicesca.org/wp-content/uploads/Bail-Reform-in-California-UCLA-2017.pdf (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review).
56. Id. at 5.
57. Pretrial Release in California: Legal Parameters for Evidence-Based Practices, supra note 16, at 10.
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the purpose of and flaws inherent in county bail schedules.58 Subsection b
illuminates the disparities in county bail schedules.59 Subsection c focuses on the
judges’ use of discretion to set high bail amounts.60
a. Bail Schedules Contribute to California’s High Bail Amounts and
Punish Indigent Detainees
Multiple counties in California set bail at different amounts for similar
offenses.61 Courts set bail by using a predetermined bail amount from a
standardized schedule that judges must adopt and revise annually.62 Most counties
in California use bail schedules during the bail hearing process.63 California
adopted bail schedules to streamline the bail process and set quick uniform
amounts.64
Criminal justice experts have found there are issues with using a streamlined
process to set bail.65 Courts use the bail schedule to set a bail amount based on the
offense, often without regard to the arrestees’ characteristics.66 Overall, California
has a median bail amount that at $50,000 is five times higher than the rest of the
country.67 Bail schedules also use other factors, like criminal history, that increase
the amount of bail.68 Many offenders are unable to pay the high bail under a bail
schedule, so they are held in jail before trial.69 The courts holding detainees in jail
pretrial correlates with the detainees committing new criminal activity after their
case is resolved.70 Courts often increase bail for indigent people based on their past
crimes, especially when their inability to pay bail likely led to the new criminal

58. Infra Subsection II.A.2.a.
59. Infra Subsection II.A.2.b.
60. Infra Subsection II.A.2.c.
61. See Carlson, supra note 3 (stating that California Penal Code requires each court in California to make
its own bail schedule and set bail amounts for offenses).
62. Id.
63. See id. (finding that 64% of the respondent counties in the United States use a bail schedule).
64. See Amatya et al., supra note 55, at 7 (showing that California adopted CAL. PEN. CODE § 1269b to
streamline the bail process).
65. See generally Carlson, supra note 3 (discussing the issues with bail schedules in California).
66. Id.
67. “Not in it for Justice” How California’s Pretrial Detention and Bail System Unfairly Punishes Poor
People,
HUM.
RTS.
WATCH
33–34
(2017),
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/usbail0417_web_0.pdf (on file with the University of the
Pacific Law Review); see also Stephanie Wykstra, Bail Reform, Which Could Save Millions of Unconvicted
People
from
Jail
Explained,
VOX
(Oct.
17,
2018),
https://www.vox.com/futureperfect/2018/10/17/17955306/bail-reform-criminal-justice-inequality (on file with the University of the Pacific
Law Review) (revealing that the federal median bail amount is ten-thousand dollars and as low as two-thousand
dollars, like in New York).
68. Amatya et. al., supra note 55, at 27.
69. “Not in it for Justice” How California’s Pretrial Detention and Bail System Unfairly Punishes Poor
People, supra note 67, at 33–34.
70. Lowenkamp et al., supra note 11, at 19.
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activity.71
b. Disparities in County Bail Schedules Based on Geographical Location
Bail schedules vary widely county by county for no discernible reason.72 There
are fifty-eight bail schedules in California, as California requires each judge to
create the schedule.73 Bail amounts average anywhere from $14,824 to $63,781.74
Judges must meet annually to revise the bail schedule, but judges only need to
consider the dangerousness of the offense when setting the bail.75 An unnamed
judge from Contra Costa admitted that judges do not base their schedules on actual
data.76 The current schedule system results in disparate bail amounts, where the
richest county—Contra Costa—sets the same bail amount as Del Norte—the
poorest county.77
c. Judges Have Used Their Discretion to Keep Detainees in Confinement
Judges make the final decision on a bail amount for detainees.78 They have the
authority to use the bail schedule or to deviate from it and set a higher bail
amount.79 Judges thus have the discretion to set bail as they would like.80 Most
judges believe that it is most safe to keep the detainee in custody.81 Some judges
oppose releasing detainees because they fear that the detainee will commit more
crimes before trial.82 Some judges will even set high bail amounts for the sole
purpose of keeping the detainee in custody.83 Most commonly, judges use the bail
71. See Amatya et al., supra note 55, at 27 (revealing that courts will increase bail amount if the arrestee
has a criminal history); see also Lowenkamp et al., supra note 11, at 19 (finding that people detained for longer
periods pretrial were more likely to commit crime than those released quickly).
72. See “Not in it for Justice” How California’s Pretrial Detention and Bail System Unfairly Punishes
Poor People, supra note 67, at 33–34 (revealing that a judge admitted the bail schedule decisions had no basis in
actual data).
73. Amatya et al., supra note 55, at 11.
74. Sonya M. Tafoya, Assessing the Impact of Bail on California’s Jail Population, PUB. POL’Y INST. CAL.
15 (June 2013), https://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_613STR.pdf (on file with the University of the
Pacific Law Review).
75. “Not in it for Justice” How California’s Pretrial Detention and Bail System Unfairly Punishes Poor
People, supra note 67, at 33.
76. Id. at 33–34.
77. Tafoya, supra note 74, at 16.
78. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1275 (West 2021).
79. Id.
80. See Pretrial Release in California: Legal Parameters for Evidence-Based Practices, supra note 16, at
10 (explaining that judges have wide discretion in setting bail despite having to act within constitutional and
statutory parameters).
81. “Not in it for Justice” How California’s Pretrial Detention and Bail System Unfairly Punishes Poor
People, supra note 67, at 59.
82. Id. at 60.
83. John Raphling, California Court Orders Judges to Follow the Law on Bail, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Feb.
8, 2018), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/02/08/california-court-orders-judges-follow-law-bail (on file with the
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schedule to set a quick bail amount.84 The detainee can request a bail hearing, but
the court usually conducts these hearings in haste.85 County citizens elect Superior
Court judges into their position as a judge.86 Most judges oppose pretrial release
resulting in more crime because they must answer to the public that elects them.87
B. “Prison Industrial Complex” in California
Many companies are turning a profit under the current detention system in this
era of mass incarceration.88 America is detaining more of its own population than
any other country in the world.89 Therefore, many criminal justice experts named
the current era the “Prison Industrial Complex.”90 High incarceration rates turned
the criminal justice system into a profitable tool for many industries.91 The bail
bonds industry profits from mass incarceration in the detention system, earning
billions a year.92 Subsection 1 explains the scope of the issue in California.93
Subsection 2 discusses how California’s cash bail system feeds into the Prison
Industrial Complex.94
1. Mass Incarceration in California
Jails have grown, profits have grown, and jail populations have grown steadily
over the last thirty years.95 California jail populations have increased by 180%

University of the Pacific Law Review).
84. See Amatya et al., supra note 55, at 7 (showing that California adopted bail schedules to streamline the
bail process).
85. “Not in it for Justice” How California’s Pretrial Detention and Bail System Unfairly Punishes Poor
People, supra note 67, at 31.
86.
See
Fact
Sheet,
JUD.
COUNCIL
CAL.
3
(Oct.
2020),
https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/California_Judicial_Branch.pdf (on file with the University of the Pacific
Law Review) (explaining how county voters elect Superior Court judges).
87. “Not in it for Justice” How California’s Pretrial Detention and Bail System Unfairly Punishes Poor
People, supra note 67, at 60; see also Fact Sheet, supra note 86, at 3 (providing election details on justices in
California).
88. See Understanding and Confronting the Prison-Industrial Complex, supra note 12, at 4 (indicating a
network of companies profit from American prisons, thus creating a “prison industrial complex”).
89. See id. at 5 (detailing how America has approximately 2.3 million people under correctional
supervision).
90. Id. at 4.
91. Id. at 5.
92. See id. at 11 (describing how bail bond agents exploit the detention system to make two billion dollars
of profit annually).
93. Infra Subsection II.B.1.
94. Infra Subsection II.B.2.
95. See Kara Gotsch & Vinay Basti, Capitalizing on Mass Incarceration: U.S. Growth in Private Prisons,
SENT’G PROJ. (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/capitalizing-on-massincarceration-u-s-growth-in-private-prisons/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (detailing the
exponential growth in private prisons and their populations).
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since 1970.96 Drug convictions account for most of the penal population
explosion.97 Drug arrests more than tripled during this time, as police conducted a
record number of drug sweeps and suspicionless stops and searches that primarily
affected people of color.98 Mass incarceration has devastating effects on
communities of color because of the economic distress it can cause, like the loss
of a job.99 Further, communities of color can have broken families because
detention leads to the loss of children.100
Courts also charge the detainee fees that perpetuate a cycle of poverty and
incarceration.101 Sixty percent of detainees have an annual income of under
$12,000 prior to arrest.102 Courts can charge the detainee fees to pay to the
probation department or the court.103 Courts can also charge detainees for drug
tests or other treatments as conditions of their parole.104 Courts can modify the
arrestee’s sentence or garnish their wages for being unable to pay their fees.105
Further, a cash bail system results in more convictions because many detainees
will accept plea deals so they may go home.106 A majority of the felony convictions
today are the result of plea bargains.107 Many detainees face minor charges that
would not require jail time, but they cannot secure their release because of their
inability to pay bail.108 These low-level offenders eventually take a plea deal that
gets them released, but under the condition that they have a record and are on
probation.109 The offender is now likely to face jail time in the future for a

96.
Incarceration
Trends
in
California,
VERA
INST.
JUST.
(2019),
https://www.vera.org/downloads/pdfdownloads/state-incarceration-trends-california.pdf (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review).
97. MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE 33 (The New Press, rev. ed. 2006).
98. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS
91 (The New Press, 10th ed. 2020); see also “Not in it for Justice” How California’s Pretrial Detention and Bail
System Unfairly Punishes Poor People, supra note 67, at 98 (remarking that New York’s “Stop-and-Frisk” policy
mostly affected people of color, with 80% of the individuals affected being people of color).
99. See Understanding and Confronting the Prison-Industrial Complex, supra note 12, at 5 (“Those
convicted of felony offenses—primarily blacks and Latinxs—suffer profound, long-term collateral consequences,
including, but not limited to, lost voting and civil rights and legalized discrimination in employment, housing,
and access to public benefits.”).
100. See id. (detailing the devastation to communities caused by mass incarceration).
101. ALEXANDER, supra note 98, at 193.
102. Id. at 194.
103. Id. at 193.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106.
Emily
Yoffe,
Innocence
Is
Irrelevant,
ATLANTIC
(2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/09/innocence-is-irrelevant/534171/ (on file with the
University of Pacific Law Review).
107. See id. (revealing that 97% of convictions at the state level are the result of plea bargains).
108. Id.
109. Id.
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probation violation.110 Cash bail fuels the growth of pretrial and convicted prison
populations.111
2. California’s Cash Bail System Allows Pretrial Detainment of Many
Individuals
The bail bond industry profits off the California detention system.112 Bail bond
agents have a unique position in our detention system because they can imprison
debtors, seize a home, and make a profit from detainees.113 Bail bond agents can
also choose to charge people lower fees.114 They usually base their decision on a
detainee’s access to finances or collateral.115 The agents collect some of the largest
premiums from California detainees because of the percentage they charge and the
high median bail amount.116
California’s incarceration rate stands out nationally because it ranks higher
than entire countries like France and Italy.117 California’s pretrial cash bail policies
drive the growth of jails since there are more individuals held pretrial than there
are individuals convicted.118 California jails steadily grew to account for the high
number of pretrial detainees.119 Further, private jails have become more prominent
in California as the prisoner population grows.120

110. See id. (providing an example of how an individual who took a plea deal was later charged with
violating his probation).
111. See Incarceration Trends in California, supra note 96 (showing statistics that there has been a jail
population increase).
112. Understanding and Confronting the Prison-Industrial Complex, supra note 12, at 10–11.
113. See The Devil in the Details: Bail Bond Contracts in California, UCLA CRIM. JUST. REFORM CLINIC
1 (May 2017), https://static.prisonpolicy.org/scans/UCLA_Devil%20_in_the_Details.pdf (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review) (detailing legal contract terms that give the bail bond agent the ability to
charge extra fees or seize a home).
114. See id. at 12 (reporting that bail bond agents can offer lower premium charges based on the detainee’s
wealth).
115. See id. at 1 (explaining that a bail agent will charge a detainee a lower premium if they hire a private
attorney, belong to a union, or have more collateral).
116. See SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 262, at 9 (Mar. 23, 2021)
(explaining the need for the bill because bail agents charge 10% of the bail amount); see also “Not in it for
Justice” How California’s Pretrial Detention and Bail System Unfairly Punishes Poor People, supra note 67, at
33–34 (revealing that California’s median bail amount is five times the federal median).
117. See California Profile, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, https://www.prisonpolicy.org/profiles/CA.html
(last visited July 12, 2021) (on file with the University of the Pacific) (reporting that California’s incarceration
rate—individuals incarcerated per 100,000 population—of 581 is higher than all founding NATO countries).
118. See id. (shedding light on a chart that shows the pretrial jail population is about fourteen-thousand
individuals greater than the convicted population).
119. See Incarceration Trends in California, supra note 96 (showing the growth of pretrial population in
California since 1970).
120. Id.
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III. SB 262
SB 262—or the Safe and Resilient Communities Act—strived to set zerodollar bail by exempting all misdemeanors and most felony offenses from having
bail.121 Senator Hertzberg, SB 262’s author, moved the bill to the inactive file after
a murder occurred because he believed the killing hurt the bill’s chance of
passing.122 He stated he intends to reintroduce the bill in the next session, turning
SB 262 into a two-year bill.123 SB 262 would have added more exempt offenses to
the list that disqualify defendants from zero-dollar bail.124 SB 262 would have
required courts to consider whether setting zero-dollar bail for exempt offenses
will protect the public while ensuring the defendants return to trial.125 Furthermore,
if courts find bail necessary, SB 262 would have required them to set bail at a level
the arrestee has the present ability to pay.126.
Additionally, SB 262 would have ended all county-wide bail schedules and
instead implements a statewide bail schedule.127 SB 262 set forth that the Judicial
Council of California shall prepare the new statewide bail schedule.128 The Judicial
Council consists of a Chief Justice and fourteen judges, and they will annually
revise the new bail schedule.129 SB 262 would have required all county courts to
adhere to one statewide bail schedule.130
SB 262 also would have made alterations to detainees paying premiums to bail
bond agents.131 SB 262 would have required bail bond agents to return the
detainee’s premium if the detainee makes all necessary court appearances.132 Also,
the bail bond agent must return the premium if the court does not convict the

121. See SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 262, at 1 (Mar. 23, 2021)
(putting forth that all misdemeanors and felonies must have zero-dollar bail except serious and violent felonies);
see also CAL. PEN. CODE § 1192.7 (West 2012) (listing forty-two offenses as serious felonies).
122
See Evan Symon, Bail Reform Bill Dies in Assembly Following High-Profile Crimes Linked to No-Bail
Releases, CAL. GLOBE (Sept. 10, 2021), https://californiaglobe.com/articles/bail-reform-bill-dies-in-assemblyfollowing-high-profile-crimes-linked-to-no-bail-releases/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review)
(detailing how the bill died after a man released on zero-dollar bail murdered a women and her dog shortly after
his release).
123
Id.
124. See SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 262, at 1 (Mar. 23, 2021)
(amending existing law to include the following offenses that cannot have bail set to zero dollars: interference
with a person’s exercising of civil rights, hate crimes, human trafficking, willful harm to a child, corporal
punishment upon a child, crimes against an elder or dependent adult, and assault with a deadly weapon).
125. Hearing on SB 262 Before the S. Comm. on Pub. Safety, 2021 Leg., 2021–2022 Sess. (Cal. 2021)
[hereinafter 262 Pub. Safety Hearing] (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
126. SB 262, 2021 Leg. 2021–2022 Sess. (Cal. 2021) (as amended on May 20, 2021, but not enacted).
127. 262 Pub. Safety Hearing, supra note 123.
128. Id.
129. Id.; see, e.g., Judicial Council, STATE BAR CAL., http://www.calbar.ca.gov/About-Us/Who-WeAre/Committees/Overview-of-Volunteer-Opportunities/Judicial-Council (last visited Aug. 10, 2021) (on file with
the University of Pacific Law Review) (providing the general information on the California Judicial Council).
130. 262 Pub. Safety Hearing, supra note 123.
131. See id. (adding CAL. PEN. CODE § 1302.5).
132. Id.
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detainee or dismisses the case.133 Further, SB 262 would have limited the amount
of the nonrefundable premium paid to the bail bondsmen to no more than five
percent.134
IV. ANALYSIS
SB 262 was California’s attempt to reform a cash bail system that detains
people solely because they cannot pay bail.135 The California Legislature would
had allowed many courts to release low-level offenders quickly on zero-dollar
bail.136 Subsection A discusses how SB 262 was the right step to address bail
reform as it allows courts to release low-level offenders quickly.137 Subsection B
explains why SB 262 would not have alleviated all problems with cash bail.138
Subsection C focuses on other potential solutions to California’s bail issue, like
delegating some of the judge’s discretion or providing guidance in making the
statewide bail schedule.139
A. SB 262 is a Progressive Step for Bail Reform in California
SB 262 would have been beneficial to solving the bail problem because courts
will release many offenders before trial, regulate bail agents, and a statewide bail
schedule will resolve disparities.140 Subsection 1 illustrates how a zero-dollar bail
would have led to quick pretrial releases of California defendants.141 Subsection 2
discusses the benefits of what would have been the new limits on bail bond
agents.142 Subsection 3 argues that a statewide bail schedule would have alleviated
the disparities in bail amounts across California.143
1. Detainees Would Have Been Released Quickly with Zero-Dollar Bail Thus
Lowering the Prison Population

133. See id. (adding that the bail agent must return the premium paid by the detainee also if the court
dismisses the action).
134. Id.; see Paul Heaton et al., The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69
STAN. L. REV. 711, 721 (2017) (finding that the bail bond premium is usually set at 10% and nonrefundable).
135. See 262 Pub. Safety Hearing, supra note 123 (citing In re Humphrey’s holding that courts must have
financial considerations for bail determinations).
136. See id. (requiring the court to dismiss bail if various conditions are met).
137. Infra Section IV.A.
138. Infra Section IV.B.
139. Infra Section IV.C.
140. See 262 Pub. Safety Hearing, supra note 123 (providing the requirements for courts to release lowlevel offenders, order bail agents to return premiums, and adopt a statewide bail schedule).
141. Infra Subsection IV.A.1.
142. Infra Subsection IV.A.2.
143. Infra Subsection IV.A.3.
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SB 262 would have eliminated a large portion of the pretrial detention
population in California because courts would not require offenders to pay any
money to ensure their release.144 Over 825,000 arrestees in California would have
qualified for immediate release after booking because they are misdemeanor
arrests.145 These offenders would have gone home instantly because SB 262 would
have required courts to release them without the need for a hearing.146 It is essential
for bail reform to release low-level offenders quickly because this would allow the
detainee to go home where they can build their defense.147
Further, this helps the mass incarceration problem in California because it
would have lowered jail populations.148 Zero-dollar bail would have reduced
California’s penal population because detainees who cannot afford bail will not
feel forced to take on a plea deal.149 This reduction in penal population will then
lower convictions because the court will not put the offender on probation.150
Releasing low-level offenders quickly gives detainees the opportunity to build a
defense from home and ignore plea deals.151
2. Detainees Would Have Benefited from California’s Regulations on Bail
Bond Agents
SB 262 would have allowed the bail bond agent to charge a premium worth
five percent of the bail amount, rather than the industry standard of ten percent.152
Detainees would have benefited from SB 262 because they would have been more
likely to secure a surety to ensure their release since there would have been lower
premiums they would have to pay.153 Further, SB 262 would have required the

144. SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 262, at 1 (Mar. 23, 2021).
145. See California’s Criminal Justice System: A Primer, LEGIS. ANALYST OFF. (Jan. 17, 2013),
https://lao.ca.gov/reports/2013/crim/criminal-justice-primer/criminal-justice-primer-011713.aspx (on file with
the University of the Pacific Law Review) (providing the statistics of misdemeanor arrests in California).
146. 262 Pub. Safety Hearing, supra note 123; see also Kristi Leigh, Zero Dollar Bail Explained after
COVID-19 Positive Man Released from Jail, FOX (Apr. 15, 2020), https://kmph.com/news/local/fresno-countyhealth-officials-wont-identify-covid-19-positive-man-released-from-jail (on file with the University of the Pacific
Law Review) (explaining that courts adopted zero-dollar bail because the courts could not conduct the hearings).
147. See Yoffe, supra note 106 (explaining offenders out on cash bail would have more time and resources
for their case and be less likely take a plea deal so the court releases them).
148. See generally California’s Criminal Justice System: A Primer, supra note 147 (listing 741,122 adult
and 84,333 juvenile arrests for misdemeanors in 2011 alone).
149. See Yoffe, supra note 106 (noting that many defendants facing minor charges that would not require
further incarceration “feel compelled to take whatever deal the prosecutor offers, even if they are innocent”).
150. See id. (detailing how the arrestees detained pretrial would take deals that gives them a record and
puts them on probation so they can go home).
151. See id. (explaining that a benefit of releasing detainees pretrial is that they can go home and work on
their case more effectively without taking a deal).
152. See 262 Pub. Safety Hearing, supra note 123 (noting the need to limit the premium a bail bond agent
can charge); see also Paul Heaton et al., supra note 136, at 721 (finding that the bail bond premium is usually set
at 10%).
153. 262 Pub. Safety Hearing, supra note 123.
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premium to be refundable when it is usually not.154 Refunds are preferable for
detainees because they would have the opportunity to pay a lower premium
knowing that the government may return the premium if they are innocent.155
Ultimately, refunds will lower the profit the bail bond industry makes under the
current detention system.156 Lowering the bail bond industry’s profit would have
benefited the detention system because it would have diminished their leverage in
California’s politics.157 This would have allowed for further advancements in bail
reform in the future without the influence of an industry that profits off of indigent
detainees.158
3. A Statewide Bail Schedule Would Have Eliminated the Disparate Bail
Amounts in California Counties
A statewide bail schedule would have set consistent bail amounts for every
offense that every county’s court must follow.159 The practice of using county bail
schedules is unjust because county judges often set bail amounts in their counties
with no basis in data.160 Detainees all over California would have benefited from a
statewide bail schedule because the fifty-eight counties will no longer have a wide
variance in amounts.161 With a statewide bail schedule, detainees would have no
longer encountered higher bail amounts solely because of their location.162
B. SB 262 Would not Have Alleviated the Problem of Poor Offenders Detained
Pretrial in Some Instances

154. Id.; see also Paul Heaton et al., supra note 136, at 721 (finding that the bail bond premium is usually
nonrefundable).
155. See SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 262, at 1 (Mar. 23, 2021)
(setting forth the requirement that fees be returned to the arrestee).
156. See Understanding and Confronting the Prison-Industrial Complex, supra note 12, at 11 (citing the
high premiums and exploitation of poor detainees as the reason the bail bond industry profits in America’s
detention system).
157. Maria Dinzeo, Bid to End Cash System Fails in California, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Nov. 4, 2020),
https://www.courthousenews.com/bid-to-end-cash-bail-system-fails-in-california/ (on file with the University of
the Pacific Law Review).
158. See generally Understanding and Confronting the Prison-Industrial Complex, supra note 12, at 10–
11 (explaining how some for-profit companies “financially exploit those within the criminal justice system [and]
cut corners in ways that threaten safety and wellbeing”).
159. 262 Pub. Safety Hearing, supra note 123.
160. “Not in it for Justice” How California’s Pretrial Detention and Bail System Unfairly Punishes Poor
People, supra note 67, at 33–34 (revealing that a judge admitted the bail schedule decisions had no basis in actual
data).
161. See 262 Pub. Safety Hearing, supra note 123 (proposing a statewide bail schedule); see also Tafoya,
supra note 74, at 15 (revealing the wide variance of bail amounts across California counties); see also Amatya et
al., supra note 55, at 16 (reporting that there are fifty-eight bail schedules in California).
162. See Tafoya, supra note 74, at 16 (reporting the disparate bail amounts by county in California).
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SB 262 would not have solved all of the bail system’s problems.163 SB 262
would not had eliminated the unfair cash bail practices for everyone because some
offenders would have not qualified for zero-dollar bail.164 Further, the bill would
not change pretrial practices when the prosecutor alleges the detainee committed a
felony.165 Subsection 1 explains how many poor offenders will remain in jail when
they do not qualify for zero-dollar bail.166 Subsection 2 discusses how SB 262
would have not changed the level of discretion judges have.167
1. Poor Offenders Would Have Remained Incarcerated When They did not
Qualify for Zero-Dollar Bail.
Arrestees who would not qualify for zero-dollar bail would have likely had to
pay bail because SB 262 would not eliminate the bail requirement for most
felonies.168 SB 262 cited many offenses that are exempt from receiving zero-dollar
bail, one of which is the broadly defined “serious” or “violent” felony offense.169
The penal code defines a serious or violent felony as including another forty-two
offenses such as carjacking, murder, and rape.170 SB 262 would have not changed
the reality for an indigent detainee because they would have still had to remain in
jail due to their inability to pay bail or secure a surety.171
SB 262 would have offered some help to the detainee because of the new
regulations on the bail bond industry, but it would not be enough.172 SB 262 would
have not regulated the agents amply because a detainee would still have to pay a
premium of 5%, which would still be too high for an indigent person.173 It would
have been too high because a premium of five percent on the average bail amount
of $50,000 would be $2,500.174 This premium would have been high for the

163. See 262 Pub. Safety Hearing, supra note 123 (providing that the bill sets forth exempt offenses and
only requires courts to consider nonfinancial means when setting bail).
164. See id. (citing a total of thirteen offenses on the list of offenses that do not qualify for zero-dollar
bail).
165. See id. (providing that the bill does not set zero-dollar bail for all offenses).
166. Infra Subsection IV.B.1.
167. Infra Subsection IV.B.2
168. 262 Pub. Safety Hearing, supra note 123.
169. Id.
170. See CAL. PEN. CODE. § 1192.7 (West 2021) (providing the list of all forty-two serious offenses); see
also id.§ 667.5 (West 2019) (providing the definition for violent offenses but the defenses overlap with § 1192.7).
171. See Kalish, supra note 6 (reporting that there are roughly 40,000 people in county jails, and about
half are there because they are unable to post bail).
172. See 262 Pub. Safety Hearing, supra note 123 (limiting the premium a bail bond agent can charge to
5% of the bail amount).
173. See SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 262, at 9 (Mar. 23, 2021)
(explaining how the bill would allow bail bond agents to keep 5% of the premium) .
174. See “Not in it for Justice” How California’s Pretrial Detention and Bail System Unfairly Punishes
Poor People, supra note at 67, at 33–34 (explaining the impact of high premiums and that California’s median
bail amount is high compared to the rest of the country at $50,000).
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average offender because two-thirds of detainees report an income under $12,000,
and a $2,500 premium would be 21% of that income.175
The detainee may get a refund of their premium, but the requirements to get
the refund are limited.176 Not all detainees would have received the refund because
a court would have to dismiss the case to allow it, and courts dismiss only a scant
percent of cases.177 The detainee could have still secured the refund if they made
all of their trial appearances, but missing one hearing would have forfeited the
premium to the bail bond agent.178 This system would have maintained the
presumption of guilt for alleged felony offenders because they would have
remained detained if they would have not been able to pay bail without any guilty
conviction.179
2. SB 262 Would Have Left All Discretionary Power to the Judges Which
Has Led to High Bail Amounts in the Past
California’s Penal Code gives judges the discretion to set bail with many
considerations after the right to bail diminished in the 1980s.180 SB 262 would have
added another factor to the Penal Code for the judge to consider: the detainee’s
finances.181 This requirement would have not changed our bail system
meaningfully because judges could have still set high bail after considering the
detainee’s finances.182 SB 262’s requirement that a judge consider new factors
when setting bail would not have changed the potential abuse of discretion judges
use to set high bail amounts.183
Under SB 262, the legislature would have required the court to deliberate on
the detainee’s ability to pay, just like the superior court did in Kenneth Murphy’s
case.184 The superior court did just what SB 262 would have required—considering
175. See ALEXANDER, supra note 98, at 194 (revealing that two-thirds of detainees “report annual incomes
under $12,000).
176. SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 262, at 9 (Mar. 23, 2021).
177. See SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 262, at 9 (Mar. 23, 2021)
(providing the requirements to receive a refund of the premium paid to the bail agent); see also Statewide
Caseload Trends, JUD. COUNCIL CAL. 1, 55 (2020), courts.ca.gov/documents/2020-Court-Statistics-Report.pdf
(on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (reporting 17% of felonies disposed before trial were
dismissals, acquittals, or transfers).
178. 262 Pub. Safety Hearing, supra note 123.
179. See Hegreness, supra note 15, at 952 (defining the change in our bail system as a switch from
presumption of innocence to presumption of guilt).
180. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1275 (West 2021); see also supra Subsection II.A.1 (detailing the history of the
right to bail).
181. See 262 Pub. Safety Hearing, supra note 123 (providing that judges must consider new things such
as the detainee’s finances).
182. See CAL. PEN. CODE. § 1275(a) (West 2021) (providing discretion to judges after considering required
factors); Pretrial Release in California: Legal Parameters for Evidence-Based Practices, supra note 16, at 10.
183. See Raphling, supra note 83 (revealing that justices typically set a high bail to keep people who they
should release in jail).
184. 262 Pub. Safety Hearing, supra note 123; see also In re Humphrey, 11 Cal. 5th 135, 145 (2021)
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the detainee’s ability to pay—and still set bail at a high amount.185 SB 262 would
not have changed the outcome of Mr. Murphy’s case, even if the judge decided his
case after the bill’s enactment.186 That is because requiring a court to deliberate on
a factor does not limit a judge’s discretion in ignoring that information.187 SB 262
requiring judges to consider a detainee’s finances would not have changed the
judge’s ability to impose bail despite an arrestee’s financial hardship.188
C. The Legislature can Fix These Issues by Delegating Some Judicial Authority
and Providing More Guidance with Bail Schedules
The Legislature can adopt new proposals that can further solve the cash bail
problem in California.189 Subsection 1 explains the possibility of fixing high bail
amounts by delegating some discretion to the community or agencies.190
Subsection 2 focuses on how providing more guidance for the judicial council in
creating bail schedules can lower the high bail amounts in California.191
1. Delegating the Judge’s Discretion Will Benefit Detainees Because
Community Members Will Assist with Bail Order
In California, judges use their authority to set high bail amounts or deny bail
altogether using their discretion.192 SB 262 would not have changed this because
there is no variation to the powers of judges to delegate their authority.193 The
California Penal Code codifies the requirement for the judge or magistrate to issue
the final ruling on bail.194 Courts have interpreted this as not allowing any other
party or agency to make a ruling on a detainee’s bail.195

(discussing the superior court’s ruling in Kenneth Murphy’s bail hearing).
185. 262 Pub. Safety Hearing, supra note 123; see In re Humphrey, 11 Cal. 5th 135, 145 (2021) (discussing
the superior court’s ruling in Kenneth Murphy’s bail hearing).
186. See 262 Pub. Safety Hearing, supra note 123 (requiring the court to consider the detainee’s ability to
pay); see also In re Humphrey, 11 Cal. 5th 135, 145 (2021) (discussing how the superior court did not substantially
change the bail amount after considering the defendant’s ability to pay).
187. See generally In re Humphrey, 11 Cal. 5th 135, 145 (2021) (discussing how the superior court did not
substantially change the bail amount after considering the defendant’s ability to pay).
188. See 262 Pub. Safety Hearing, supra note 123 (requiring only that the judge “consider” the factors).
189. See id. (showing the current bill legislators proposed).
190. Infra Subsection IV.C.1.
191. Infra Subsection IV.C.2.
192. See Pretrial Release in California: Legal Parameters for Evidence-Based Practices, supra note 16,
at 10 (detailing how law gives judges total discretion in making bail decisions).
193. See generally 262 Pub. Safety Hearing, supra note 123 (omitting any new rules changing the amount
of authority a judge has in making bail decisions).
194. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1275 (West 2021).
195. See Pretrial Release in California: Legal Parameters for Evidence-Based Practices, supra note 16,
at 10 (providing that courts have recognized the judge shall make the final determination on bail); see also Avery
Oaks, ALEC Fights for Cash Bail Leading Defendants to Jail, 3 SOC. JUST. EQUITY L.J. 84, 120 (2019) (describing
PSAs as agencies that collect information on detainees and make recommendations for release).
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The California legislature can invite more input from the community or
Pretrial Services Agency (“PSA”) by changing the language in California Penal
Code.196 The Legislature can change the law from forbidding the judge delegating
authority to a new law that invites more input from others.197 This change would
benefit detainees because parties from the community will work with the judge to
make a ruling that is beneficial for the detainee and the public.198 The legislature
can also require judges to consider the recommendation on bail from the
community and reflect on the record why they would deviate from the
recommendation.199 This change would benefit detainees because it allows
community members to change a ruling that directly affects their livelihood.200
2. Legislative Guidance on Forming a Statewide Bail Schedule can Help
Lower California’s Bail Amounts
Bail schedules contribute to high bail, so it would benefit the system if the
Legislature provides more guidance on making the statewide schedule.201
Currently, the only guidance given on schedule structure is to consider the
seriousness of the charge.202 The Legislature should add new factors for the judicial
council to consider that directly coincide with the finances of offenders.203 Indigent
detainees would benefit if the Legislature added median income by offense to
schedules because judges would realize that a high bail amount means the detainee
would remain in custody.204 This benefits detainees because it would make the
formation of bail schedules less arbitrary.205

196. See Pretrial Release in California: Legal Parameters for Evidence-Based Practices, supra note 16,
at 10 (highlighting that a limitation on evidence-based pretrial programs are statutes that give judges all of the
authority).
197. See generally id. (explaining the delegation of authority judges maintain).
198. See Oaks, supra note 197, at 120 (illuminating the benefits of using PSAs in other jurisdictions).
199. See CAL. PEN. CODE § 1270.1(a) (West 2021) (requiring the judge to reflect on the record why zerodollar bail is unfit for the detainee, a process that can be extended to community recommendations).
200. See Oaks, supra note 197, at 120 (using Washington D.C. as an example of beneficial results when
the courts use agencies).
201. “Not in it for Justice” How California’s Pretrial Detention and Bail System Unfairly Punishes Poor
People, supra note 67, at 33.
202. Id.
203. See 262 Pub. Safety Hearing, supra note 123 (setting forth the requirement for judges to consider
finances during the bail hearing, but omitting any further guidance on bail schedules).
204. See generally “Not in it for Justice” How California’s Pretrial Detention and Bail System Unfairly
Punishes Poor People, supra note 67, at 33 (stating that the judges do not put much consideration into the bail
amounts).
205. See id. (revealing how judges had no guidance in making the schedule, thus the process was arbitrary).
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V. CONCLUSION
California’s cash bail system contributes to mass incarceration in America.206
SB 262 was the legislature’s attempt to eliminate the unfair practices of cash bail
for all non-exempted misdemeanor and felony offenses.207 The cash bail system
effectively requires indigent detainees to sit in jail and wait for trial solely because
they are too poor.208 Cash bail gives bail bond agents the authority to make a profit
while exploiting the system.209 SB 262 would have attempted to solve these issues
by setting zero-dollar bail for most low-level offenders, and by regulating the bail
bond industry practices.210
However, SB 262 would not have alleviated all issues with the bail system
since several offenders would continue to sit in jail when they do not qualify for
zero-dollar bail.211 Further, SB 262 would have not changed the amount of
discretion judges have in setting high bail amounts.212 The California legislature
can diminish these problems by passing bills that allow judges to delegate some of
their discretion to members of the community or the PSA.213 Also, they can provide
guidance for the Judicial Council when they make the bail schedules to lower the
bail amounts that remain.214 The Legislature would have been making progress
with this bail reform, but there would have been more work necessary to fully
alleviate the social problems that California’s cash bail system perpetuates.215

206. Gotsch & Basti, supra note 95.
207. 262 Pub. Safety Hearing, supra note 123; see also SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY,
COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 262, at 5 (Mar. 23, 2021) (revealing that “thousands of Californians accused of
crimes end up paying a fee to stay out of jail, before even being found guilty”).
208. Kalish, supra note 6.
209. See generally The Devil in the Details: Bail Bond Contracts in California, supra note 113, at 1
(exposing how bail bondsmen have a uniquely powerful position in the system because they have complete
discretion in setting premiums arrestees pay and can arrest delinquent debtors).
210. 262 Pub. Safety Hearing, supra note 123.
211. Id.
212. See generally Hegreness, supra note 15, at 957 (explaining that introducing new factors for the judge
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